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Abstract
Stochastic multi-armed bandits form a class of on-
line learning problems that have important appli-
cations in online recommendation systems, adap-
tive medical treatment, and many others. Even
though potential attacks against these learning al-
gorithms may hijack their behavior, causing catas-
trophic loss in real-world applications, little is
known about adversarial attacks on bandit algo-
rithms. In this paper, we propose a framework of
offline attacks on bandit algorithms and study con-
vex optimization based attacks on several popular
bandit algorithms. We show that the attacker can
force the bandit algorithm to pull a target arm with
high probability by a slight manipulation of the re-
wards in the data. Then we study a form of online
attacks on bandit algorithms and propose an adap-
tive attack strategy against any bandit algorithm
without the knowledge of the bandit algorithm.
Our adaptive attack strategy can hijack the behav-
ior of the bandit algorithm to suffer a linear regret
with only a logarithmic cost to the attacker. Our
results demonstrate a significant security threat to
stochastic bandits.
1. Introduction
Understanding adversarial attacks on machine learning sys-
tems is essential to developing effective defense mecha-
nisms and an important step toward trustworthy artificial
intelligence. A class of adversarial attacks on machine learn-
ing that have received much attention is data poisoning (Big-
gio et al., 2012; Mei & Zhu, 2015; Xiao et al., 2015; Alfeld
et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016; Wang & Chaudhuri, 2018). Here,
the attacker is able to access the leaner’s training data, and
has the power to manipulate a fraction of the training data
in order to make the learner satisfy certain objectives. This
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is motivated by modern industrial scale applications of ma-
chine learning systems, where data collection and policy
updates are done in a distributed way. Attacks can happen
when the learner is not aware of the attacker’s access to the
training data.
While there has been a line of research on adversarial at-
tacks on deep learning (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Huang
et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2017) and supervised learning (Big-
gio et al., 2012; Mei & Zhu, 2015; Xiao et al., 2015; Alfeld
et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016), little is known on adversarial
attacks on stochastic multi-armed bandits, which is a form
of online learning with limited feedback. This is potentially
hazardous since stochastic MAB are widely used in the
industry to recommend news articles (Li et al., 2010), dis-
play advertisements (Chapelle et al., 2015), allocate medical
treatment (Thompson, 1933) among many others. Hence,
understanding the impact of adversarial attacks on bandit
algorithms is an urgent yet open problem.
Recently, there has been an important piece of offline data
poisoning attacks for the contextual bandit algorithm (Ma
et al., 2018). They assume that the bandit algorithm updates
periodically and that the attacker can manipulate the rewards
in the data before the updates in order to hijack the behavior
of the bandit algorithm. Consider the news recommendation
as a running example for this offline attack model. A news
website has K articles (i.e., arms or actions) and runs a ban-
dit algorithm to learn a recommendation policy. Every time
a user visits the website, the bandit algorithm displays an
article based on historical data. Then the website receives
a binary reward indicating whether the user clicks on the
displayed article or not. The website keeps serving the users
throughout the day and updates the bandit algorithm during
the night. An attacker can perform offline data poisoning
attacks before the bandit algorithm is updated. More specif-
ically, the attacker may poison the rewards collected during
the daytime and control the behavior of the bandit algorithm
as it wants. The authors in (Ma et al., 2018) show that the
offline attack strategy on LinUCB-type contextual bandit
algorithm (Li et al., 2010) can be formulated as a convex
optimization problem. However, offline attack strategies for
classical bandit algorithms are still open.
In contrast to offline attacks, an online form of data poison-
ing attacks against bandit algorithms has also been proposed
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by (Jun et al., 2018). They assume that the bandit algorithm
updates step by step and the attacker sits in-between the ban-
dit environment and the bandit algorithm. At each time step,
the bandit algorithm pulls an arm and the attacker eaves-
drops on the decision. Then the attacker makes an attack by
manipulating the reward generated from the bandit environ-
ment. The bandit algorithm receives the poisoned reward
without knowing the presence of the attacker and updates
accordingly. The goal of the attacker is to control which
arm appears to the bandit algorithm as the best arm at the
end. Efficient attack strategies against -greedy and Upper
Confidence Bounds (UCB) algorithms are proposed by (Jun
et al., 2018). However, online attack strategies for other
bandit algorithms (e.g., Thompson Sampling (Thompson,
1933) and UCBoost (Liu et al., 2018)) are still unknown.
In this work, we have a systematic investigation of data
poisoning attacks against bandit algorithms and address the
aforementioned open problems. We study the data poisoning
attacks in both the offline and the online cases. In the offline
setting, the bandit algorithm updates periodically and the
attacker can manipulate the rewards in the collected data
before the update occurs. In the online setting, the attacker
eavesdrops on the bandit algorithm and manipulates the
feedback reward. The goal of the attacker is that the bandit
algorithm considers the target arm as the optimal arm at the
end. Specifically, we make the following contributions to
data poisoning attacks on stochastic bandits.
1. We propose an optimization based framework for of-
fline attacks on bandit algorithms. Then, we instantiate
three offline attack strategies against -greedy, UCB
algorithm and Thompson Sampling, which are the so-
lutions of the corresponding convex optimization prob-
lems. That is, there exist efficient attack strategies for
the attacker against these popular bandit algorithms.
2. We study the online attacks on bandit algorithms and
propose an adaptive attack strategy that can hijack any
bandit algorithm without knowing the bandit algorithm.
As far as we know, this is the first negative result show-
ing that there is no robust and good stochastic bandit
algorithm that can survive online poisoning attacks.
3. We evaluate our attack strategies by numerical results.
Our attack strategies are efficient in forcing the bandit
algorithms to pull a target arm at a relatively small
cost. Our results expose a significant security threat
as bandit algorithms are widely employed in the real
world applications.
More recently, there is a line of works by (Lykouris et al.,
2018; Gupta et al., 2019) studying an adversarial corruption
model. While they assume that the attacker has to attack all
the arms before the learner chooses an arm, we consider the
case where the attacker’s strategy is aware of and adaptive to
the decision of the learner. The difference leads to opposite
results. While they propose a robust bandit algorithm, our
work shows that the existing algorithms are vulnerable to
the adversarial attacks.
This paper is organized as the following. In Section 2, we
introduce the problem setting and attack system models.
Then, we propose the offline attack problem in Section 3. In
Section 4, we study the online attack problem and propose
an adaptive attack strategy. The numerical results to evaluate
our attack strategies are provided in Section 5. Finally, we
conclude the paper with discussion in Section 6.
2. Problem Formulation
We consider the classical stochastic bandit setting. Suppose
that there is a set A = {1, 2, . . . ,K} of K arms and the
bandit algorithm proceeds in discrete time t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
At each round t, the algorithm pulls an arm at ∈ A and the
bandit environment generates a reward rt ∈ R such that
rt = µat + ηt, (1)
where ηt is a zero-mean, σ-subGaussian noise and µat is
the instantaneous reward at time t. In other words, the
expected reward of pulling arm a is µa. Note that {µa}a∈A
are unknown to the bandit algorithm and the attacker.
The performance of the bandit algorithm is measured by
the regret, which is the expected difference between the
total rewards obtained by an oracle that always pulls the
optimal arm (i.e., the arm with the largest expected reward
maxa∈A µa) and the accumulative rewards collected by the
bandit algorithm up to time horizon T . Formally, the regret
R(T ) is given by
R(T ) = E
[
max
a∈A
µaT −
T∑
t=1
rt
]
. (2)
In this work, we consider the uniformly good bandit algo-
rithm that incurs sub-linear regret, i.e., R(T ) = o(T ).
For each reward rt returned from the bandit environment,
the attacker manipulates the reward into
r′t = rt + t. (3)
Then the accumulated attack cost of the attacker, C(T ),
is measured by the norm of the vector (1, . . . , T )T . For
simplicity, we consider the l2-norm in the offline setting and
the l1-norm in the online setting. Note that the results in
this work can be easily extended to any norm. For example,
consider the lp-norm, the total attack cost of the attacker is
C(T ) =
(
T∑
t=1
|t|p
)1/p
. (4)
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of size T
(at, rt)
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Figure 1: Offline attack system model
Without loss of generality, we assume that arm a∗ is a sub-
optimal attack target, such that µa∗ < maxa∈A µa. The
attacker’s goal is to manipulate the bandit algorithm into
pulling arm a∗ frequently. To avoid being detected, the
attacker also wants to keep the cost as small as possible.
2.1. Offline attack system model
The offline attack system model is illustrated in Figure 1.
Besides the bandit algorithm, the bandit environment and
the attacker, there is a data buffer of size T . This models
the setting where updates of the bandit algorithm happen in
mini-batches of size T . For round t = 1, . . . , T , the bandit
algorithm sequentially pulls arm at. Then the environment
generates the reward rt according to Equation (1) and send
the tuple (at, rt) to the data buffer. The data buffer stores
the data stream until round T . At the end of round T , the
attacker accesses the data buffer and poisons the data by
Equation (3). Finally, the data buffer sends the poisoned
data stream {(at, r′t)}t≤T to the bandit algorithm and the
bandit algorithm updates according to the received data
without knowing the existence of the attacker.
The goal of the attacker in the offline setting is to force
the bandit algorithm to pull the target arm a∗ with high
probability at round T+1 (i.e., after updating with poisoned
data) while incurring only a small cost. This means that the
attacker wants to make the poisoning effort t as small as
possible to keep stealthy.
2.2. Online attack system model
The online attack system model is illustrated in Figure 2. In
the online setting, the bandit algorithm updates instantly for
each time step. The attacker stealthily monitors the decision
of the bandit algorithm at at each time t and poisons the
reward signal returned from the bandit environment by equa-
tion (3). Then the bandit algorithm receives the manipulated
reward signal r′t and updates unaware of the attacker.
The goal of the attacker in the online setting is to hijack the
behavior of the bandit algorithm with high probability by
manipulating the reward signal so that the bandit algorithm
bandit
environment
attacker
bandit
algorithm
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Figure 2: Online attack system model
pulls the target arm a∗ in Θ(T ) time steps. In the meantime,
the attacker wants to control its attack cost by poisoning
as infrequently as possible in order to avoid being detected.
Note that t = 0 is considered as no attack.
By the linearity of expectation and ηt is a zero-mean noise,
R(T ) =
∑
a∈A
(
max
i∈A
µi − µa
)
E[Na(T )], (5)
where Na(t) is the number of pulling arm a up to time
t. Thus, the attack goal means that the attacker wants the
bandit algorithm to incur a linear regret by incurring only a
sub-linear attack cost.
3. Offline Attacks
In this section, we introduce the offline attack framework
to stochastic bandits. The updates of the bandit algorithm
happen in mini-batches of size T 1. Between these consecu-
tive updates, the bandit algorithm follows a fixed algorithm
obtained from the last update. This allows the attacker to
poison the historical data before the update and force the
algorithm to pull a target arm a∗ with high probability.
Let ma be the number of times arm a was pulled up to time
T , i.e., ma := Na(T ). For each arm a ∈ A, let ~ya ∈ Rma
be the corresponding reward vector returned from the bandit
environment when arm a was pulled. That is, ~ya := (rt :
at = a)
T . Let~a ∈ Rma be the poisoning attack strategy of
the attacker, i.e.,~a := (t : at = a)T . The poisoned reward
vector for arm a after the attack becomes ~ya + ~a. To avoid
being detected, the attacker hopes to make the poisoning ~a
as small as possible. Without loss of generality, we consider
the l2-norm attack cost in the offline attacks. We have that
C(T )2 =
T∑
t=1
2t =
∑
a∈A
||~a||22. (6)
Thus, the attacker’s offline attack problem can be formulated
1The batch size T is a relatively large integer compared to K.
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as the following optimization problem P ,
P : min
~a:a∈A
∑
a∈A
||~a||22 (7)
s.t. P{aT+1 = a∗} ≥ 1− δ, (8)
for some error tolerance δ > 0. Note that we define the
attack goal as forcing the bandit algorithm to pull arm a∗ at
the next round with high probability. This is because there
are some randomized bandit algorithms, such as -greedy
and Thompson Sampling. It is not feasible to force the
randomized algorithm to pull a target arm with probability 1.
But it is possible to hijack the behavior of the randomized
algorithm with high probability.
Proposition 1. Given some error tolerance δ > 0. If
{~∗a}a∈A is the optimal solution of problem P , then it is
the optimal offline attack strategy for the attacker.
The proof of Proposition 1 follows from equation (6) and
the definition of offline attacks. Note that the constraint
of problem P depends on the bandit algorithm. Now, we
assume that the attacker knows the bandit algorithm and
we introduce algorithm-specific offline attack strategies de-
rived from the optimization problem P for three popular
bandit algorithms, -greedy, UCB and Thompson Sampling.
For simplicity, we denote the post-attack empirical mean
observed by the bandit algorithm at the end of round t as
µ˜a(t) :=
1
Na(t)
t∑
τ=1
r′τ1{aτ = a}. (9)
3.1. Offline attack on -greedy
Now, we derive the offline attack strategy for the -greedy
algorithm, which is a randomized algorithm with some de-
creasing rate function αt. Typically, αt = Θ(1/t). At each
time t, the -greedy algorithm pulls an arm
at =
{
draw uniformly over A, w.p. αt
arg maxa∈A µ˜a(t− 1), otherwise
. (10)
At time step T + 1, the -greedy algorithm uniformly sam-
ples an arm from the arm set A with probability αT+1,
which cannot be controlled by the attacker. Then, we set
the error tolerance as δ = K−1K αT+1 since the target arm
a∗ may also be pulled in the uniform sampling. Thus, the
attacker poisons the reward such that the target arm a∗
has the largest empirical mean. After the attack, the -
greedy algorithm pulls an arm aT+1 at time T + 1 such that
P{aT+1 = a∗} = 1− δ. In order to make the target arm the
unique arm with the largest empirical mean, we introduce
a margin parameter ξ > 0. So the attacker’s optimization
problem for attacking -greedy algorithm is the following
problem P1,
P1 : min
~a:a∈A
∑
a∈A
||~a||22 (11)
s.t. µ˜a∗(T ) ≥ µ˜a(T ) + ξ, ∀a 6= a∗, (12)
where µ˜a(T ) = (~ya + ~a)T1/ma and 1 is the vector that
each element is 1. The condition in the above optimization
implies that the -greedy algorithm will play the target arm
a∗ at the time step T + 1 with probability of at least 1 −
K−1
K αT+1. The following result shows that there exists at
least one optimal solution of problem P1, i.e., one optimal
offline attack for the -greedy algorithm.
Theorem 1. Given any margin parameter ξ > 0. For any
reward instance {~ya}a∈A, there exists at least one optimal
solution of problem P1, which is a quadratic program with
linear constraints. Hence, there exists at least one optimal
offline attack for the -greedy algorithm.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Section A.1 in the
supplementary material. Note that the error tolerance pa-
rameter, δ = K−1K αT+1, depends on the rate function αt of
the -greedy algorithm, which is not controllable by the at-
tacker. This counts the exploration introduced by the bandit
algorithm’s inner randomization, which can not be manip-
ulated by the attacker. However, the attacker can wait for
some large enough T since the rate function αt goes to zero
finally. Moreover, the attacker’s strategy (problem P1) does
not depend on the rate function, i.e., the attacker does not
require the knowledge of the parameter of the -greedy.
3.2. Offline attack on UCB
Now we derive the offline attack strategy for the classical
UCB algorithm. For each time t, the UCB algorithm pulls
the arm with the highest UCB index:
at = arg max
a∈A
ua(t) := µ˜a(t−1)+3σ
√
log t
Na(t− 1) . (13)
The UCB algorithm pulls the target arm a∗ at time T + 1 if
and only if the UCB index of arm a∗ is the unique largest
one. Thus, the attacker can manipulate the rewards to satisfy
the condition. Given any margin parameter ξ > 0, the
attacker’s optimization problem becomes
P2 : min
~a:a∈A
∑
a∈A
||~a||22 (14)
s.t. ua∗(T + 1) ≥ ua(T + 1) + ξ, ∀a 6= a∗
The condition in the above optimization implies that the
UCB algorithm will pull the target arm after the poisoning
attack. The following result shows that there exists at least
one optimal solution of problem P2, i.e., one optimal offline
attack for the UCB algorithm.
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Theorem 2. Given any margin parameter ξ > 0. For any
reward instance {~ya}a∈A, there exists at least one optimal
solution of problem P2, which is a quadratic program with
linear constraints. Hence, there exists at least one optimal
offline attack for the UCB algorithm.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theo-
rem 1. Note that the above attack strategy holds for any
error tolerance δ since UCB algorithm is not randomized.
3.3. Empirical mean based bandit algorithms
One insight from our offline attacks on the -greedy algo-
rithm and the UCB algorithm is that the empirical mean
based algorithms are vulnerable to attack. This is be-
cause the empirical mean related constraints are linear and
non-empty. Then the optimization problem P becomes a
quadratic problem with non-empty linear constraints, which
can be solved efficiently. This result holds for many other
variants of UCB algorithms and Explore-Then-Commit al-
gorithms (Garivier et al., 2016) (which uniformly samples
the arm set in the first exploration phase and commit to the
arm with the largest empirical mean in the second commit-
ment phase).
3.4. Beyond empirical means: Thompson Sampling for
Gaussian distributions
We have shown that the empirical mean based algorithms
are not secure against the offline attack. It would appear that
Bayesian algorithms should be more robust to the offline
attack as the constraint of problem P becomes non-tractable.
Unfortunately, we find that Thompson Sampling, a popular
Bayesian algorithm, is also vulnerable to the data poisoning.
Now, we derive the attack strategy for Thompson Sam-
pling for Gaussian distributions2. In other words, the noise
ηt is i.i.d. sampled from Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2).
Thompson Sampling for Gaussian distribution with the Jef-
freys prior (Korda et al., 2013) works as the following. For
each time t, the algorithm samples θa(t) from the posterior
distribution N (µ˜a(t− 1)/σ2, σ2/Na(t− 1)) for each arm
a independently. Then the algorithm pulls the arm with the
highest sample value, i.e., at = arg maxa∈A θa(t).
Let φ(x) = 1√
2pi
e−x
2/2 be the probability density function
(pdf) of the standard Gaussian distribution and Φ(x) be
the corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf).
For simplicity, we denote φa(x) as the pdf of the Gaussian
distribution N (µ˜a(T )/σ2, σ2/Na(T )) for each arm a and
Φa(x) as the corresponding cdf. Since we are interested
in the samples in time T + 1, we omit time index in the
2Thompson Sampling needs distribution models and Gaussian
distribution is popular and well-studied in the literature. The idea
of problem relaxation here can be extended to other distributions.
following discussion. By the law of total expectation, we
have that
P{aT+1 = a∗} = P{∩a 6=a∗θa∗ > θa} (15)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
P{∩a6=a∗θa < x|θa∗ = x}φa∗ (x) dx
=
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πa6=a∗P{θa < x|θa∗ = x})φa∗ (x) dx
=
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πa 6=a∗Φa(x))φa∗ (x) dx. (16)
The Equation (16) is complicated to compute and analyze,
which makes the instantiation of the offline attack prob-
lem P non-trivial. To address this challenge, we derive a
sufficient constraint of the original constraint and make a
relaxation of the original problem P . By the union bound,
we have that
P{aT+1 6=a∗} = P{∪a 6=a∗θa∗<θa}≤
∑
a6=a∗
P{θa∗<θa}
=
∑
a6=a∗
Φ
(
µ˜a(T )− µ˜a∗(T )
σ3
√
1/ma + 1/ma∗
)
(17)
Thus, we are ready to introduce the attacker’s problem for
Thompson Sampling for Gaussian distributions,
P3 : min
~a:a∈A
∑
a∈A
||~a||22 (18)
s.t.
∑
a 6=a∗
Φ
(
µ˜a(T )− µ˜a∗(T )
σ3
√
1/ma + 1/ma∗
)
≤ δ (19)
µ˜a(T )− µ˜a∗(T ) ≤ 0, ∀a 6= a∗ (20)
The constraint of problem P3 is a sufficient condition to the
constraint of the problem P by Equation (17). Note that the
linear constraints (20) are redundant since Φ(0) = 0.5 and
δ < K−12 is usually satisfied. The following proposition
shows that the constraint set of problem P3 is convex.
Proposition 2. The constraint set formed by Equations (19)
and (20) is convex.
The proof of Proposition 2 is provided in Section A.3 in the
supplementary material. The following result shows that
there exists at least one optimal solution of problem P3 that
is a feasible offline attack for the Thompson Sampling for
Gaussian distributions.
Theorem 3. Given any error tolerance δ > 0. For any
reward instance {~ya}a∈A, there exists at least one optimal
solution of problem P3, which is a quadratic program with
convex constraints. Hence, there exists at least one feasible
offline attack for the Thompson Sampling algorithm for
Gaussian distributions.
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By Proposition 2, the proof of Theorem 3 is similar to the
proof of Theorem 1. Note that the above attack strategy is
not the optimal attack strategy formulated by P . However, it
is easy to compute since problem P3 is a quadratic program
with convex constraints. Another relaxation of problem P
is presented in Section A.4 in the supplementary material.
4. Online Attacks
In this section, we study online attacks against stochastic
bandits. In the online attack setting, the bandit algorithm
updates its policy at each round. The attacker eavesdrops
on the decision (i.e., at) of the bandit algorithm and poisons
the reward by adding an arbitrary t ∈ R. Hence the reward
observed by the bandit algorithm is r′t = rt + t. Without
loss of generality, we consider the l1-norm attack cost. That
is, the cost of the attacker for round t is |t|. Recall that
Na(t) is the number of pulling arm a up to time t.
Without the attacks, the bandit algorithm is a uniformly
good policy such that it achieves O(log T ) regret3, i.e.,
E[
∑
a(maxi µi − µa)Na(T )] = O(log T ) for any prob-
lem instance {µa}a∈A. Moreover, the expected number of
pulling the optimal arm (with the highest expected reward)
is T − o(T ).
The goal of the attacker is to force the bandit algorithm to
pull the sub-optimal target arm a∗ as much as possible and
pays the least possible total cost. Formally, the attacker
wants the bandit algorithm to receive linear expected regret,
i.e., E[Na∗(T )] = T − o(T ), and pays the expected total
cost E[
∑T
t |t|] = O(log T ). In other words, the attacker
wants to manipulate the rewards so that the bandit algorithm
considers the target arm as the best arm in the long term.
4.1. Oracle constant attacks
The fact that the attacker does not know the expected re-
wards {µa}a∈A is challenging because otherwise the at-
tacker can perform the attack trivially. Suppose the attacker
knows the expected rewards, then the attacker can choose
the following oracle attack strategy,
t = −1{at 6= a∗}[µat − µa∗ + ξ]+, (21)
for some margin parameter ξ > 0. Note that [·]+ indicates
the function such that [x]+ = max{x, 0} and 1{·} is the
indicator function. By this attack, the bandit algorithm sees
a poisoned bandit problem, where the target arm a∗ is the
optimal arm and all the other arms are at least ξ below
the target arm. Thus, the bandit algorithm pulls the target
arm with E[Na∗(T )] = T − o(T ) and pays the total cost
E[
∑T
t |t|] = O(log T ) since t are bounded. This result
has been shown in (Jun et al., 2018) as the following.
3The results in this section directly apply to the problem-
independent regret bounds and high probability bounds.
Proposition 3. (Proposition 1 in (Jun et al., 2018)) As-
sume that the bandit algorithm achieves an O(log T ) regret
bound. Then the oracle attack with ξ > 0 succeeds, i.e.,
E[Na∗(T )] = T − o(T ). Furthermore, the expected attack
cost is O(
∑
i6=a∗ [µi − µa∗ + ξ]+ log T ).
The insight obtained from Proposition 3 is that the attacker
does not need to attack in round t if at = a∗. This helps
us to design attack strategies that are similar to the ora-
cle attack. When the ground truth {µa}a∈A is not known
to the attacker, the attacker may guess some upper bound
{Ca}a6=a∗ on {[µa−µa∗ ]+}a 6=a∗ and perform the following
oracle constant attack,
t = −1{at 6= a∗}Cat . (22)
The following result shows the sufficient and necessary
conditions for the oracle constant attack to be successful.
Proposition 4. Assume that the bandit algorithm achieves
an O(log T ) regret bound. Then the constant attack with
{Ca}a6=a∗ succeeds if and only if Ca > [µa − µa∗ ]+, ∀a 6=
a∗. If the attack succeeds, then the expected attack cost is
O(
∑
a6=a∗ Ca log T ).
The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Section B.1
in the supplementary material. Proposition 4 shows
that the attacker has to know the unknown bounds on
{[µa−µa∗ ]+}a6=a∗ to guarantee a successful constant attack.
Moreover, the oracle constant attack is non-adaptive to the
problem instance since some upper bound Ca can be much
larger than the quantity [µa − µa∗ ]+ so that the attacker
is paying unnecessary attack cost compared to the oracle
attack. To address this challenge, we propose an adaptive
constant attack that can learn the bandit environment in an
online fashion and perform the attack adaptively.
4.2. Adaptive attack by constant estimation
Now, we are ready to propose the adaptive attack strategy.
The idea is that the attacker can update upper bounds on
the unknown quantity {[µa − µa∗ ]+}a 6=a∗ based on the
empirical mean observed by the attacker. Then the attacker
performs the constant attack based on the estimated upper
bounds. Note that the attacker observes the tuple (at, rt)
at each time t and is able to obtain an unbiased empirical
mean. Let µˆa(t) be the pre-attack empirical mean observed
by the attacker at time t, that is
µˆa(t) :=
1
Na(t)
t∑
τ=1
rτ1{aτ = a}. (23)
Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), we define a function β(n) as
β(n) =
√
2σ2
n
log
pi2Kn2
3δ
. (24)
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Then, the following result shows that {β(Na(t))}a∈A is a
high-probability bound on the pre-attack empirical mean of
all arms on all rounds. Define the event
E = {∀a ∈ A,∀t : |µˆa(t)− µa| < β(Na(t))}. (25)
Lemma 1. (Lemma 1 in (Jun et al., 2018)) For δ ∈ (0, 1),
P(E) > 1− δ.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows from Hoeffding inequality
and union bound. Lemma 1 shows that with probability at
least 1− δ, we have that the expected reward µa is within
the interval (µˆa(t)−β(Na(t)), µˆa(t)+β(Na(t))) centered
at the pre-attack empirical mean µˆa(t). Thus, we obtain
an upper bound on the quantity µa − µa∗ and propose the
following Adaptive attack by Constant Estimation (ACE),
t=−1{at 6=a∗}[µˆat(t)−µˆa∗(t)+β(Nat(t))+β(Na∗(t))]+.
The following shows that the ACE is successful for any ban-
dit algorithm without the knowledge of the bandit algorithm.
Theorem 4. Given any δ ∈ (0, 0.5), assume that the bandit
algorithm achieves an O(log T ) regret bound with probabil-
ity at least 1− δ. With probability at least 1− 2δ, the ACE
attacker forces the bandit algorithm to play the target arm
a∗ in Na∗(T ) times, such that Na∗(T ) = T − o(T ), using
an instantaneous attack cost,
|t|≤1{at 6=a∗}
(
[µat−µa∗ ]++2β(Nat(t))+2β(Na∗(t))
)
.
In particular, with probability at least 1−2δ, the ACE attack
is successful and the accumulated attack cost is
T∑
t=1
|t| ≤ O
∑
a6=a∗
(
[µa − µa∗ ]+ + 4β(1)
)
log T
 .
The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Section B.2 in the
supplementary material. Theorem 4 shows that the ACE
is universally successful for any bandit algorithm, without
knowing any prior information on {µa}a∈A. Besides, the
ACE incurs an high-probability accumulated attack cost as
small as that of the oracle attack4 with only an additional
bounded additive term, O(4β(1)K log T ). That is, the ACE
is close to the hindsight-oracle attack strategy. Moreover,
the ACE even requires no knowledge of the bandit algorithm.
This is an advantage over the algorithm-dependent online
attack strategies designed in (Jun et al., 2018) since the
attacker may not know which bandit algorithm the learner
is in practice. As far as we know, this is the first negative
result showing that there is no robust bandit algorithm that
can be immune to the adaptive online attack. This exposes
a significant security threat to the bandit learning systems.
5. Numerical Results
In this section, we run simulations on attacking -greedy,
UCB and Thompson Sampling algorithms to illustrate our
theoretical results. All the simulations are run in MATLAB
and the codes can be found in the supplemental materials.
Note that we implement -greedy with αt = 1t .
5.1. Offline attacks
To study the effectiveness of the offline attacks, we consider
the following experiment. The bandit has K = 5 arms
and the reward noise is a Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2)
with σ = 0.1. The attacker’s target arm is arm K such
that µK = 0, while the expected rewards of other arms
are uniformly distributed in the unit interval [0, 1]. We set
T = 1000 and the error tolerance to δ = 0.05.
In each attack trial, we first generate the instance of the
bandit by drawing the expected rewards from the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Then we run the bandit algorithm for
T rounds and collect all the historical data. Without any
attack, the bandit algorithm would have converged to some
optimal arm in the trial, which is not the target arm as the
target arm is the one with the least payoff. Then we set the
margin parameter as ξ = 0.001 and run the corresponding
offline attacks. The attack strategy is the solution of the op-
timization problem Pi. Since all the problems are quadratic
program with linear (convex) constraints, they can be solved
by standard optimization tools.
We run 1000 attack trials. Note that the attack cost depends
on the instance of the bandit. To evaluate the attack cost, we
use the poisoning effort ratio (Ma et al., 2018):
||~||2
||~y||2 =
√∑
a∈A ||~a||22∑
a∈A ||~ya||22
. (26)
The poisoning effort ratio measures the ratio of the total cost
over the norm of the original rewards. To evaluate the attack
effectiveness, we check whether the poisoned data satisfy
the constraint of the optimization problem P . If so, the
bandit algorithm will play the target arm with probability at
least 1− δ.
Figure 3 shows the results of the attack against the -greedy,
UCB and Thompson Sampling. First, the attack strategies
are effective as all the attacks are successful. Second, the
attack costs are small as shown in the histograms. The ratios
of attacking -greedy, UCB and Thompson Sampling are
less than 10%, 2% and 5%.
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Figure 3: Histograms of poisoning effort ratio in the offline attacks.
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Figure 4: Attack cost and target arm pulls in the online attacks.
5.2. Online attacks
We compare our adaptive attack strategy with two attack
strategies proposed by (Jun et al., 2018). Note that these two
attacks are against -greedy and UCB algorithm and require
the knowledge of the algorithm. In contrast, we highlight
that our attack strategy ACE is an universal attack strategy
against any bandit algorithm.
We consider the following experiment. The bandit has two
arms. The expected rewards of arms 1 and 2 are µ1 = ∆
and µ2 = 0 with ∆ > 0. The attacker’s target is arm 2. The
noise of the rewards is i.i.d. sampled from the Gaussian dis-
tribution N (0, σ2) with σ = 0.1. We set the error tolerance
to δ = 0.05 and time horizon to T = 105 rounds. For the im-
plementations of the attack strategies proposed by (Jun et al.,
2018), we choose the tuning parameter ∆0 = σ, which is
4High-probability bounds can be adapted from Proposition 3.
suggested by (Jun et al., 2018) when T is not known to the
attacker. We run 100 attack trials with different ∆ values.
Figure 4 shows the average attack cost and number of target
arm pulls in the online attacks. Note that the target arm pulls
are the cases when ∆ = 1. First, we compare the number of
target arm pulls with ACE attack and without. ACE attack
dramatically forces the bandit algorithm to pull the target
arm linearly in time. Second, the attack costs are relatively
small compared to the loss of the bandit algorithm, which
is linear in time. Generally, the attack costs of ACE attack
are bounded by O(log T ) and increase as the reward gap
∆ becomes larger. These verify the result of Theorem 4.
On the other hand, the attack costs on Thompson Sampling
and -greedy are relatively smaller than that of UCB. This
is because Thompson Sampling and -greedy converges to
the “optimal” arm very fast while the exploration for “non-
optimal” arm may still increase over time. Finally, compared
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to the algorithm-specific attacks proposed by (Jun et al.,
2018), the attack cost of ACE on -greedy is slightly worse
while the attack cost of ACE on UCB is much larger than
Jun’s attack. In the case of attacking UCB algorithm, our
universal attack strategy takes more cost than the algorithm-
specific attack, but without the need to know the algorithm.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we study the open problem of data poisoning
attacks on bandit algorithms. We propose an offline at-
tack framework for the stochastic bandits and propose three
algorithm-specific offline attack strategies against -greedy,
UCB and Thompson Sampling. Then, we study an online at-
tack against the bandit algorithms and propose the adaptive
attack strategy that can hijack the behavior of any bandit
algorithm without requiring the knowledge of the bandit
algorithm. Our theoretical results and simulations show that
the bandit algorithms are vulnerable to the poisoning attacks
in both online and offline setting.
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Data Poisoning Attacks on Stochastic Bandits
A. Details on the offline attacks
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The optimization problem P1 is a quadratic program with linear constraints in {~a}a∈A. Now it remains to show
that the constraint set is non-empty.
Given any reward instance {~ya}a∈A, any margin parameter ξ > 0 and any ~a∗ , one can check that
~a =
[
(~ya∗ + ~a∗)
T1/ma∗ − ~yTa 1/ma − ξ
]
1, ∀a 6= a∗, (27)
satisfies the constraints of problem P1. That is the constraint set of problem P1 is non-empty.
Thus, there exists at least one optimal solution of problem P1 since P1 is a quadratic program with non-empty and compact
constraints. The result follows from Proposition 1.
A.2. Details on attacking Thompson Sampling
Lemma 2. Given some constants Ci > 0 for any i < K. The function f(~x) =
∑K−1
i=1 Φ(Cixi − CixK) is convex on the
domain D = {~x ∈ RK |xi − xK ≤ 0,∀i < K}.
Proof. We prove the result by checking the Hessian matrixH of function f(~x). Note that Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1). For any i < K, we have that
∂f
∂xi
=
Ci√
2pi
e−(Cixi−CixK)
2/2, (28)
∂2f
∂x2i
= − C
2
i√
2pi
e−(Cixi−CixK)
2/2(Cixi − CixK). (29)
On the other hand, we have that
∂f
∂xK
=
K−1∑
i=1
− Ci√
2pi
e−(Cixi−CixK)
2/2 =
K−1∑
i=1
− ∂f
∂xi
, (30)
∂2f
∂x2K
=
K−1∑
i=1
− C
2
i√
2pi
e−(Cixi−CixK)
2/2(Cixi − CixK) =
K−1∑
i=1
∂2f
∂x2i
. (31)
Now, we derive the other coefficients. For any pair (i, j) such that i 6= j, i < K and j < K, we have that
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
= 0. (32)
For any i < K, we have that
∂2f
∂xi∂xK
=
C2i√
2pi
e−(Cixi−CixK)
2/2(Cixi − CixK) = −∂
2f
∂x2i
, (33)
∂2f
∂xK∂xi
= −∂
2f
∂x2i
(34)
Since the constants Ci are positive, we have that ∂
2f
∂x2i
≥ 0 in the domain D. The Hessian matrix of f is the following,
H =

∂2f
∂x21
0 . . . 0 −∂2f
∂x21
0 ∂
2f
∂x22
. . . 0 −∂2f
∂x22
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . ∂
2f
∂x2K−1
− ∂2f
∂x2K−1
−∂2f
∂x21
−∂2f
∂x22
. . . − ∂2f
∂x2K−1
∑K−1
i=1
∂2f
∂x2i

. (35)
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Hence, for any vector ~y ∈ RK , we have that
~yTH~y = ~yT

∂2f
∂x21
(y1 − yK)
∂2f
∂x22
(y2 − yK)
...
∂2f
∂x2K−1
(yK−1 − yK)∑K−1
i=1 −∂
2f
∂x2i
(yi − yK)

=
K−1∑
i=1
∂2f
∂x2i
(yi − yK)2 ≥ 0. (36)
Since H is positive semi-definite, we show that f(~x) is convex on the domain D.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By Lemma 2 and the fact that affine mapping keeps the convexity, we have the result.
A.4. Another relaxation of P for Thompson Sampling
We may find a sufficient constraint to equation (17) as
Φ
(
µ˜a(T )− µ˜a∗(T )
σ3
√
1/ma + 1/ma∗
)
≤ δ
K − 1 , ∀a 6= a
∗. (37)
Then, we derive another relaxation of P as
P4 : min
~a:a∈A
∑
a∈A
||~a||22 (38)
s.t. µ˜a(T )− µ˜a∗(T ) ≤ σ3
√
1/ma + 1/ma∗Φ
−1
(
δ
K − 1
)
, ∀a 6= a∗ (39)
Note that problem P4 is a quadratic program with linear constraints.
B. Details on the online attacks
B.1. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. By equation (5), a logarithmic regret bound implies that the bandit algorithm satisfies E[Na(T )] = O(log T ) for
any suboptimal arm a. Note that the oracle constant attack shifts the expected rewards of all arms except for the target
arm a∗. Since Ca > [µa − µa∗ ]+, ∀a 6= a∗, the best arm is now the target arm a∗. Then, the bandit algorithm satisfies
E[Na(T )] = O(log T ), ∀a 6= a∗. Thus, the expected number of pulling the target arm is
E[Na∗(T )] = T −
∑
a 6=a∗
E[Na(T )] = T − o(T ). (40)
Since the attacker does not attack the target arm, we have that
E[C(T )] = E
[
T∑
t=1
|t|
]
=
∑
a 6=a∗
CaE[Na(T )] = O
∑
a 6=a∗
Ca log T
 . (41)
On the other hand, suppose there exists an arm i 6= a∗ such that Ci ≤ [µi − µa∗ ]+, then the attack is not successful. In the
case that Ci < [µi − µa∗ ]+, the arm i is the best arm rather than the target arm a∗ in the shifted bandit problem. That is
the expected number of pulling arm a∗ is E[Na∗(T )] = O(log T ). In the case that Ci = [µi − µa∗ ]+, the arm i and a∗ are
both the best arms. That is the expected attack cost is E[C(T )] = T − o(T ). In neither case is the attack successful. This
concludes the proof.
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B.2. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Given any δ > 0, we have that P(E) > 1− δ by Lemma 1. Under the event E, we have that at any time t and for
any arm a 6= a∗,
µa − µa∗ < µˆa(t)− µa∗ + β(Na(t)) (42)
< µˆa(t)− µˆa∗(t) + β(Na(t)) + β(Na∗(t)), (43)
which implies that
[µa − µa∗ ]+ < [µˆa(t)− µˆa∗(t) + β(Na(t)) + β(Na∗(t))]+. (44)
By the same argument in the proof of Proposition 4, we have that under event E, the attacker is taking an effective attack for
any bandit algorithm.
Recall that the bandit algorithm has a high-probability bound such that the regret is bounded by O(log T ) with probability
at least 1− δ. Under event E, we have that Na(T ) = O(log T ) for any a 6= a∗ with high probability. Thus, with probability
at least 1− 2δ, we have that Na∗(T ) = T − o(T ). It remains to bound the cost of the attacker, i.e.,
∑
t |t|.
Given any arm a 6= a∗, any time t and under the event E, we have that
µˆa(t)− µˆa∗(t) < µa − µˆa∗(t) + β(Na(t)) (45)
< µa − µa∗ + β(Na(t)) + β(Na∗(t)). (46)
This implies that
[µˆa(t)− µˆa∗(t)+β(Na(t)) + β(Na∗(t))]+ (47)
< [µa − µa∗ + 2β(Na(t)) + 2β(Na∗(t))]+ (48)
≤ [µa − µa∗ ]+ + 2β(Na(t)) + 2β(Na∗(t)). (49)
Thus, the first statement follows. By the fact that β(n) is a decreasing function, we have that
T∑
t=1
|t| ≤
T∑
t=1
(
[µat − µa∗ ]+ + 4β(1)
)
1{at 6= a∗} (50)
=
∑
a6=a∗
(
[µa − µa∗ ]+ + 4β(1)
)
Na(T ) (51)
≤ O
∑
a 6=a∗
(
[µa − µa∗ ]+ + 4β(1)
)
log T
 . (52)
